State of War, State of Mind: Reconsidering Mobilization in the Information Age

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2020

By LCDR Robert “Jake” Bebber, USN

Recently, American policy-makers and national security thinkers have begun to recognize that revisionist powers in Communist China and Russia have no interest in preserving the current liberal order, and instead have embarked on a course to challenge and supplant the U.S. as the world’s superpower. However, the United States is not postured to mobilize for long-term strategic competition or war with great powers. American policymakers’ assumptions regarding war preparation, prosecution, and sustainment are not aligned to the emerging 21st Century landscape being dominated by three major trends: advances in understanding of neuroscience, emerging dual-use technologies, and new financial business models.  This report takes a holistic approach toward identifying how war mobilization in the 21st Century will look different from the industrial models of the mid-to-late 20th Century. Looking beyond the Defense Department, it explores economic, policy, social, technological and informational aspects of planning and preparation. It identifies why the intelligence and national security communities are not postured to detect or anticipate emerging disruptions and strategic latency. It puts forward strategies and recommendations on how to grow American power and create new sources of comparative advantage that can be rapidly converted into both kinetic and non-kinetic effects in all domains, not just the military domain.

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China’s Rise and the Weaponization of Soft and Hard Power: How the U.S., Japan, India and Australia are Responding

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 9, September 2020

By John Garrick (Charles Darwin University) and Yan Bennett (Princeton University)

Detail from mural of Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in Berlin, Germany in 2020. Source: Yan Bennett.

China has now fully weaponized its entire soft power repertoire and dramatically upgraded its military arsenal. The Middle Kingdom is no longer unwilling to openly challenge U.S. global hegemonic supremacy or coerce less powerful nations that do not accede to its will. The shocks caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have unmasked the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to be at the centre of global power, but at the same time, the CCP also faces uncertainty over China’s chances of achieving its 2017 strategic targets set by General Secretary Xi to ‘comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society’ by 2021.

Wary of what a world order under the CCP might entail, democratic countries including the United States, Japan, Australia and India have re-activated the informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (‘Quad’). The Quad involves informal summits, information exchanges and combined military drills known as the Malabar exercises. Including Australia in this year’s Malabar drills follows an upgrade in June 2020 in the security relationship between Australia and India to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’. Why ramp-up the QSD now and what are the potential risks and benefits to member nations? Continue reading

Proposal for a global indigenous organization

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 9, September 2020

By Susan Cullen-Wetere (Ngati Maniapoto) and Bernard Cadogan (DPhil Oxford University)

Maori Meeting House Te Hono ki Hawaiki. Source: Tony Hisgett

Indigenous peoples and their protecting nation states in the Western group of nations share a common interest in democracy and the rule of law. The norm between them is a collaborative and fiduciary association that escalates race relations out of the infinite misery of grievance politics, and the cycles of rage characterising other race discourses. Both indigenous nations and their protector nations have an interest in building on the strengths of their Treaty systems, and protection mechanisms, and in excluding foreign interference inimical to the relationships they share.

It is proposed that a global indigenous organisation is formed, as a place of intellectual discourse and debate, much as is Chatham House in London, or Clingendael in The Netherlands. Continue reading

Facebook Libra And Reliance Jio Compete With WeChat By Targeting The Unbanked

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 9, September 2020

By Vikram Chopra

Source: Tim Bennett, (Unsplash).

There’s a technology arms race developing between the West and China. At the frontier are emerging technologies such as 5G, Big Data, AI, Blockchain and Crypto. China already has an advantageous position in many of these areas, including 5G and AI, and is looking to challenge Bitcoin and the US dollar with its digital Yuan.

Facebook’s recent moves with Whatsapp and Libra are interesting strategies in this larger game of global tech domination where the likes of WeChat and TikTok have been resoundingly successful market leaders. A big reason for the success of WeChat is its complete market domination within China’s 1.4 billion population. Furthermore, Wechat has seamlessly integrated into the daily lives of its users. It’s more than just a chat application: it’s a platform for shopping, ordering groceries, booking travel, dry-cleaning, reserving a table at a preferred restaurant and sending money among other services. Add the 40 million global Chinese diaspora who use WeChat to communicate with loved ones back home, and you can see why WeChat is one of the leading social media networks with over 1.2 billion users globally. Continue reading

China: The Struggle for Territory Eclipses Trade

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 6, June 2020

By William R. Hawkins

A tank unit of the Chinese Army underway. The number of tanks in China’s armored forces ranks third in the world. The main battle tanks have the ability to fight under nuclear and night conditions. Photo by: Sovfoto/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

In February 1999, President Bill Clinton opened a major foreign policy speech by  claiming, “Perhaps for the first time in history, the world’s leading nations are not engaged in a struggle with each other for security or territory. The world clearly is coming together.” This was the height of the post-Cold War delusion that history had come to an end and that a new world order had dawned based on a global partnership for economic development. Yet, Clinton knew that this was still a work in progress. In the same San Francisco speech he talked about conflicts in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and the Balkans, the threat of nuclear proliferation, and the need to bring Russia and China “into the international system as open, prosperous, stable nations.” The emphasis, however, was always on economics, a peaceful way to rise within classical liberal theory, transcending political issues and separating wealth from power in an interdependent world.

The classical liberal view held that wealth could be best pursued outside the bounds of sovereign territory. Borders were not to impede the movement of people, capital or goods which were motivated by material gain and self-improvement. Their frame of reference was the efficient use of resources world-wide to maximize global output, not their relative use among national sub-units. Peace would be the result of economic interdependence as trade could gain access to resources at less cost than conquest, and that once entangled in global supply chains, the cost of disruption for political reasons would be unbearable. The classical worldview was very popular in the 19th century prior to World War I and revived briefly during the interwar years only to be once again vanquished by World War II. The rapid onset of the Cold War kept such idealism in check, but it burst forth again after the Berlin Wall came down, symbolically opening the world to new possibilities.

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