DUP’s Ascent in Westminister and Renewed Political Instability In Belfast

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 2017

By Arindrajit Basu

As the United Kingdom attempts to recover from the fall-out of Theresa May’s failed gamble via an artificial ‘confidence and supply’[i] arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland, we must consider what this billion pound deal[ii] means for the immediate future of the ‘troubled’ devolved Parliament in Stormont.

United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May meets with Arlene Foster, head of the Democratic Unionist Party.

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Invite Taiwan Navy To RIMPAC Exercise In Hawaii

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 2017

By Anders Corr

In 1971, the U.S. started holding international naval exercises in Hawaii, and called them RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific). We invited our closest allies to participate. Now, the U.S. Navy is inviting not only allies, but Russia and China as well. Since a brief thaw in the 1990s, Russia and China are increasingly acting as adversaries rather than responsible international partners to the U.S. Most recently, China seems to have helped rather than stopped North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. It is time to invite Taiwan, not China, to RIMPAC.

Aerial view of a navy fleet with five Chinese navy warships and two America navy warships which head to Hawaii for the 2016 Pacific Rim (RIMPAC) on June 25, 2016 in the western Pacific Ocean. A Chinese navy fleet, including five ships (the missile destroyer Xi’an, the missile frigate Hengshui, the supply ship Gaoyouhu, the hospital ship Peace Ark, the submarine rescue vessel Changdao), three helicopters, a marine squad and a diving squad with 1,200 officers and soldiers, set sail from Zhoushan to Hawaii to join the RIMPAC 2016 on June 15. It is the second time that Chinese navy has participated in RIMPAC, a multilateral naval exercises led by the USA and held every two years. (Photo by VCG)

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China Expert: I’m Drunk

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 2017

By Anders Corr

The following conversation between myself and a drunk China expert, who published a well-reviewed book on China recently, covers a wide-ranging set of topics, including the hard-to-decipher policy intentions of the U.S. and China. The conversation, which occurred by email starting Friday night, April 21, is sometimes humorous, and may be politically incorrect to some. But it succinctly and candidly addresses critical themes of U.S.-China relations, and touches on the politics of China analysis in the U.S. and Europe.

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Gulf Geopolitics Casts Shadow Over Somalia

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 2017

By Haroon Mohamoud

Tribal infighting—of which the recent Gulf blockade on Qatar is merely a modern manifestation—is nothing new to the Arabian Peninsula. Feuding among the Al Sauds, Al Thanis, Al Khalifas, Al Sabahs and a handful of other royal families—who rule Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the emirates of the UAE—is almost as old as their respective genealogies (1).

In the early twentieth century, the discovery of the world’s largest oil reserves in the region brought a gradual end to scarcity, thereby removing the fuel for much of this turbulence among warring factions. And just as petrodollars financed the modernisation of the barren deserts particularly with ever higher glass towers, it has also created powerful regimes in the region that seek to enhance their geopolitical clout.

One particular arena where this export of influence is acute is in the Horn of Africa (2). Prized for its strategic position for centuries, it is fast becoming a stage where the Gulf blockade is being played out (3). The process could well be drawn out, its results long-lasting.

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Nuclear Deterrence and Four Types of Force: Definitive, Coercive, Catalytic, and Expressive

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2017

By Captain Robert C. Rubel USN (Ret)

North Korea’s drive to attain a nuclear warfare capability is currently on the front burner in the Pentagon, and is a driver of tensions in East Asia. This has precipitated plenty of dialogue in the national security community, including on the issue of extended deterrence, the policy of the US that threatens nuclear response if an ally is attacked with nuclear weapons. One input from a former colleague at the Naval War College was the final catalyst that got me tapping on the keys. First, he quoted one of his scholars as saying that the real question concerning nuclear weapons “… is whether strategic nuclear forces have any genuine relevance today in the context of deterrence and warfighting, or whether they’re troublesome legacy weapons of a bygone era.” In a subsequent email he said that he was “interested in deterrence stopping all wars, not just nuclear.” It may be that the general umbrella of nuclear deterrence did suppress some wars that might have otherwise taken place during the decades after 1945, but it is almost impossible to know. However, my colleague’s faith in the utility of the manifold uses of deterrence is not that distant from those who advocate tailored deterrence, which is a scaled or graduated deterrence structure that includes the option of preemptive strikes.[1] Tailored deterrence to some extent reflects the logic behind the DoD concept of flexible deterrent options (FDO), which are defined as “…a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent oriented actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect.”[2] In my view, such policies would incur considerable risk, as they ascribe, in an a priori manner, effects on an opponent’s political decision making and strategic planning processes in lieu of any specific intelligence (frequently) and certainly without any historical track record, especially in the nuclear arena. In this short article I will discuss a different way to analyze deterrence and gain insight into the thought processes of my colleague.

File photo taken in October 2015 in Pyongyang is of a North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missile on display during a military parade. Photo by Kyodo News via Getty Images

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Death of Celebrated Conductor Yan Liangkun Marks End of Era in China

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2017

By Arthur Waldron, Ph.D.

Yan Liangkun, last of the legendary conductors of The Yellow River Cantata (1939) the powerful classic composed by Xian Xinghai in wartime, is dead. With him dies a precious and authentic Chinese revolutionary tradition, that of those who once truly believed. Our house echoed with the music all morning. It filled with tears the eyes of me, a simple white boy from the Boston suburbs, still unable to distinguish the five grains, and prompting all sorts of reflections.

We are drawing very near to the end of an era, when people are still alive who remember the radiant vision of the New China that would arise, somehow from the good land and rivers themselves, of war ravaged China (Rana Mitter tells us 20 million dead). In their imaginations that vision still lives, under the layers of tragedy, personal suffering and disappointment, as what guided them and consumed their spirits when they were young and has never died.  Somehow we must capture this, for these were sincere people, whose love of country was simple and absolutely authentic (though few ever carried a gun: that was for the lower orders).

Shanghai, China. Xian Xinghai at about 23 years old in the 1920s. He composed the Yellow River Cantata, a classical work that uses a series of powerful Chinese melodies to evoke the beauty of China and the heroism of the war of resistance against Japan (1937-1945). Source: People’s Republic of China

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Climate Change: Denialism, or Realism?

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2017

By Dave Schroeder

Climate change.

This issue is a lot more complex than people suspect for many deemed to be denying the facts.

What many people disagree on in good faith with respect to climate change is not that it’s occurring, nor what the impacts are, or what they may be in the future. Rather, it is what the collective response of the United States should be, and what other concerns — economic, national security, energy policy, diplomatic, etc. — that response should rightly be weighed against.

Should it be a response that decimates our economy and cripples us as a nation, while serving no discernible purpose, because China, India, Russia, and Brazil do essentially nothing, with the excuse that they are developing nations?

 

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Scare of War with China in the Philippines:  Its Source and Implications to the Allied Nations

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 2017

By Sannie Evan Malala

Sannie Evan Malala is a small farmer in the Philippines.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte revealed on Friday, May 19, that Chinese President Xi Jinping had threatened war if the Philippines forced its claims in the South China Sea.  Duterte and Xi had a restricted meeting last May 15 during the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.  There Duterte expressed his plan to drill oil in the South China Sea, as he claimed.  And he said the response was “we’re friends, we don’t want to quarrel with you, we want to maintain the presence of warm relationship, but if you force the issue, we’ll go to war.”  (I think I’m familiar with this pulling of words.) This is clear lawlessness.

Rice fields on Palawan

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Investigating the Trump Scandal: Implications for Democracy and Political Risk

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 2017

By Gergana Dimova, Ph.D. [1]

The single most common question posed since the media allegations of Trump’s campaign alleged connections with Russia broke out is whether American democracy is failing and how political risk is affected. I use a database of more than 1,890 critical articles leveled at the governments in the established democracy of Germany, and the managed democracy of Russia, to place the Trump’s investigations in a comparative perspective. The analysis explains how the appointment of a special prosecutor affects the democratic nature of accountability arrangements and offers predictive statistics of political risk in the aftermath of this media scandal. It considers factors related to regime type, institutional and electoral constraints, reputational effects, policy proposals, sanctions and verbal explanations in the media.

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Iranian Presidential Elections: Does It Really Matter Who Wins?

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 2017

By Cyrus Nezakat

As the conclusion of the Iranian presidential election looms, there have been a plethora of opinions from analysts, political experts and journalists regarding the implications of the outcome of the elections. The prevailing opinions are centered on the status quo differentiation of the progressive and conservative parties in Iran and their respective candidates: incumbent President Hassan Rouhani and his chief opponent Ibrahim Raisi.

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