Nuclear Deterrence and Four Types of Force: Definitive, Coercive, Catalytic, and Expressive

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2017

By Captain Robert C. Rubel USN (Ret)

North Korea’s drive to attain a nuclear warfare capability is currently on the front burner in the Pentagon, and is a driver of tensions in East Asia. This has precipitated plenty of dialogue in the national security community, including on the issue of extended deterrence, the policy of the US that threatens nuclear response if an ally is attacked with nuclear weapons. One input from a former colleague at the Naval War College was the final catalyst that got me tapping on the keys. First, he quoted one of his scholars as saying that the real question concerning nuclear weapons “… is whether strategic nuclear forces have any genuine relevance today in the context of deterrence and warfighting, or whether they’re troublesome legacy weapons of a bygone era.” In a subsequent email he said that he was “interested in deterrence stopping all wars, not just nuclear.” It may be that the general umbrella of nuclear deterrence did suppress some wars that might have otherwise taken place during the decades after 1945, but it is almost impossible to know. However, my colleague’s faith in the utility of the manifold uses of deterrence is not that distant from those who advocate tailored deterrence, which is a scaled or graduated deterrence structure that includes the option of preemptive strikes.[1] Tailored deterrence to some extent reflects the logic behind the DoD concept of flexible deterrent options (FDO), which are defined as “…a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent oriented actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect.”[2] In my view, such policies would incur considerable risk, as they ascribe, in an a priori manner, effects on an opponent’s political decision making and strategic planning processes in lieu of any specific intelligence (frequently) and certainly without any historical track record, especially in the nuclear arena. In this short article I will discuss a different way to analyze deterrence and gain insight into the thought processes of my colleague.

File photo taken in October 2015 in Pyongyang is of a North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missile on display during a military parade. Photo by Kyodo News via Getty Images

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The New Face of Russia’s Relations with Brazil

Defense Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim, receives his counterpart from Russia, Sergei Shoigu, during bilateral meeting in Brasilia.

Defense Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim (L), receives his counterpart from Russia, Sergei Shoigu, to bilateral meeting at the Defense Ministry in Brasilia, capital of Brazil, on October 16, 2013. Shoigu’s visit included an attempt to win a $4 billion deal to supply 18 fighter jets.

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 2014.

By Matthew Michaelides

Abstract

Bilateral trade, high level personal communication, and military-technical relations between Russia and Brazil have all grown significantly over the past decade. Recent weapons sales to Brazil include a $150 million contract for MI-35 helicopters in 2009 and a 2012 deal for seven Ka-62 helicopters. Moreover, the Russian defense ministry has indicated its intention to increase Russian military capacity in Brazil and Latin America more broadly. This paper examines the causes for the increasing depth of Russian-Brazilian military-technical relations and concludes that informal patronage politics play an essential role in understanding Russian actions. A detailed analysis of contemporary Russian-Brazilian relations and existing theoretical perspectives is provided, as well as a thorough examination of recent Russian arms and equipment sales from the informal patronage politics perspective.

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