5G Fight With China: Politicization Leads to Suboptimal US Outcome

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 4, April 2019

By Anders Corr, Ph.D.

A customer wearing a headset plays a virtual reality (VR) game at a 5G experience hall on April 8, 2019 in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province of China. Photo: Long Wei/VCG via Getty Images

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced a national 5G auction of large slices (up to 3.4 gigahertz) of the millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum, along with $20.4 billion in subsidies over 10 years for rural connections, on April 12. The plan ignores expert cyber-security advice, has major security, timing, strategic and financial problems, and will not facilitate new competitors in the telecommunications market. The announcement by President Trump and FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, likely under the influence of telecommunications lobbyists, was a surprise to most experts and took place with no real public input. The auction of the mmWave spectrum is set for December 10. At the press conference announcing the decision, Chairman Pai thanked Director of the National Economic Council Larry Kudlow and Ivanka Trump for their assistance, with Ms. Trump giving a speech in support of the plan.

According to Chairman Pai at the April 12 press conference, “We finished our first 5G spectrum auction in January, and we’re holding a second, right now, that has already generated almost $2 billion in bids.” That isn’t much for a North American telecommunications industry expected to reap $294 billion in 2019 revenues.

The mmWave part of the spectrum, which is the part Chairman Pai plans to chop up for sale, does allow more connections and higher speeds, compared to sub-6 5G, in high-density areas like stadiums and major urban areas. The mmWave will likely be an important part of the 5G future. However, chopping the mmWave up leads to slower 5G speeds in this potentially ultra-fast part of the 5G spectrum. It is also drawing away attention from sub-6 5G, which requires less infrastructure, start-up costs, and has longer ranges. Virtual division of a unified sub-6 spectrum would yield equivalent speeds, up to several gigabytes per second (Gbps), to the current plan of chopping up the mmWave spectrum. The rest of the world is proceeding down the sub-6 5G path as a first step towards 5G speeds, and will likely only get to ultrafast mmWave 5G (over 20 Gbps, if not chopped apart by auctions) in the more distant future. A focus on mmWave 5G today will make U.S. companies globally uncompetitive in the short and long-run. In the short run, they will be slower in providing broad geographic coverage through sub-6 5G. In the long run, they will be unable to provide ultrafast mmWave speeds because they will have already chopped up that part of the spectrum.

The FCC has not advanced a comprehensive plan for 5G, and its hasty auction of three approximately 1.1 Ghz slices of the mmWave to three different companies may constrain future options for ultra-fast mmWave. There are major economies of scale to keeping the 3.4 Ghz total as a single spectrum, which if kept together and divided virtually is faster than spectrum that is divided ex ante. Spectrum sharing, or virtual division, yields faster speeds, given a certain amount of spectrum, than physically divided spectrum as the upcoming FCC auction will require. Virtual division and sale of spectrum is not “nationalization” as its detractors claim, but rather the only way the laws of physics allow us to get the fastest 5G speeds. Virtual spectrum division also has the market-friendly effect of encouraging small businesses and entrepreneurs to innovate and get involved in the 5G competition. Small businesses will be able to afford short-term virtual leases of shared (and therefore ultrafast) 5G spectrum, but will be unable to afford bidding for chunks of a physically chopped up (and therefore slower) 5G spectrum.  

Dividing up and concentrating on the mmWave has major strategic and practical weaknesses that could undercut U.S. national security. It addition to stifling American competition and innovation by pricing out small business and entrepreneurs, it will distract large American telecommunications companies, like AT&T and Verizon, from the international competition for sub-6 5G, which is longer-range and therefore cheaper from an infrastructure perspective. Telecommunications is also known as telecom or telco.

Chinese telecom companies like Huawei and ZTE, which are planning to first supply sub-6 5G services globally, before they enter the more rarefied mmWave space, have adopted the more competitive sequencing strategy. Most global cities will want the cheaper sub-6 5G, which is still blazing fast at several Gbps, before they proceed to the benefits of higher-cost ultra-fast mmWave spectrum at over 20 Gbps.

Lastly, an American focus on mmWave 5G will leave U.S. rural customers without effective 5G speeds for upcoming innovations in smart agriculture, like utilization of networked drones. The U.S. plan to provide rural subsidies of $20.4 billion over 10 years is woefully insufficient to bridge the infrastructure gap, which would require hundreds of billions of dollars to get mmWave 5G to all rural Americans. As 5G requires base stations every 200 meters in urban areas, and can only be marginally more spaced out in rural areas, rural mmWave 5G will probably never happen. Utilizing the sub-6 spectrum for 5G would require far fewer base stations, at one every few miles.

What then explains this lack of a coherent 5G strategy on the part of President Trump and the FCC? I would argue that they are influenced by the major telecom companies, like Verizon and AT&T, which are seeking an mmWave spectrum giveaway well in advance of demand for such spectrum. Auctioning the mmWave now, when only a few large companies could possibly bid, will drive bids to rock bottom prices. That is essentially giving away this valuable commodity, currently in the hands of taxpayers, without most citizens even realizing what they are losing. This may make sense in order to get telecom support for President Trump in the short-term, but in the long-term it comes at the expense of taxpayers and small telecom companies trying to get into the market but barred by large and unnecessary investments in mmWave infrastructure and spectrum auctions. As such, it rewards countries with more coherent strategies, most importantly China, who will win the global 5G race and as a result have access to all future information flows over global 5G networks. The power that such a future data windfall will give to China cannot be understated.

The optimal U.S. 5G strategy is to first clear and unify as much sub-6 spectrum as possible. Second, virtually lease bandwidth on this spectrum to large and small telcos, providing average consumers and companies with several Gbps speeds. And third, virtually lease a unified mmWave spectrum for special use, such as in high density urban areas, and for ultra-fast requirements of over 20 Gbps.

Use of current infrastructure for sub-6 spectrum, and shorter term leases of that spectrum, would better allow large telcos to deploy their scarce capital for sub-6 network infrastructure and devices, and facilitate entrepreneurs and small businesses in the telecom space, ultimately creating a quicker and smoother transition to 5G speeds of several Gbps, and more small business competition that would increase innovation and lower costs for American consumers. Shorter-term leases would also get top dollar for use of both sub-6 and mmWave spectrum, which would contribute to taxpayer relief, paying down the national debt, and social and defense expenditures. A quick (over 3 years) international success in the sub-6 5G space would springboard U.S. telcos into the mmWave, which can be achieved in parallel where necessary.

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Great Power Political Convergence and UN Reform: Solving the Democratic Deficit

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 4, April 2019

By Anders Corr

A bronze sculpture titled “Non-Violence” by Swedish artist Carl Fredrik Reuterswärd stands to the north of the United Nations Building in New York. It depicts the knotted barrel of a Colt Python .357 Magnum. Reuterswärd designed the sculpture following the murder of songwriter John Lennon. Credit: Vicente Montoya/Getty.

The international system operates across military, economic, and diplomatic hierarchies of states situated in competing alliances and international organizations. The major powers assert the predominance of influence in these alliances and international organizations, leading to a severe and global democratic deficit. Huge numbers of people, most notably the approximately 18% of the world’s population living in China, and 2% of the population living in Russia, have no democratically-appointed representation at the United Nations or influence in the world’s most important alliance systems.

The global democratic deficit leads to critical inefficiencies and unfair policies. States use unequal access to military, wealth, and knowledge resources to influence international organizations and alliance systems for individual state gains that lead to global inefficiencies and trade-offs where individual major power goals contradict the public good, or the national interests of other states. Perhaps the most dangerous such inefficiency is the rising risk of nuclear war, as countries like the U.S. and China compete to impose their competing visions of the future on the world.

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President Trump Has Authority to Rebuild American Industry: Use the Defense Production Act of 1950

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 2019

By William R. Hawkins

The USS Eisenhower at a dock to complete it’s overhaul, Newport News, Virginia. Ira Block/National Geographic/Getty Images

President Donald Trump’s trade reform campaign is not meant only to redress the massive deficit with the People’s Republic of China ($419 billion in goods last year, a net figure of how much American money is supporting jobs and production in China rather than at home). His policies have been rooted in national security concerns with a focus on the dangerous transfer of capital and technology that has empowered Beijing’s military buildup and aggressive behavior along the Pacific Rim and beyond. There is concern that the momentum of his efforts is slowing. He delayed elevating tariffs on Chinese goods from 10% to 25% on March 1st to give negotiations more time to reach a deal. But the PRC regime will never curb its pursuit of the wealth and capabilities it needs to replace the U.S. as the world’s preeminent power. It is a long-term economic contest between rivals for the highest of stakes imaginable.

President Trump and close advisors such as Peter Navarro, Director of the National Trade Council in the White House know this, but need to operate from a strong base. Congress cannot, however, add much to the campaign at present. It is so crippled by factions and sophistries as to have taken itself out of the game. But Congress has left a legacy from earlier, less anarchic times: the Defense Production Act. This core legislation, based on preserving the “Arsenal of Democracy” which won World War II, gives the President broad authority to revive, expand and maintain our domestic industrial base. The DPA was first enacted in 1950, but it is still alive and well, being reauthorized twice by President George W. Bush, amended in 2009 on a bipartisan basis, supported by a 2012 Executive Order issued by President Obama and reauthorized again in 2014.

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State Sponsorship of Uyghur Separatists: the History and Current Policy Options for East Turkestan (Xinjiang, China)

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 2019

By Anders Corr, Ph.D.

A 1922 map of China. Source: John Bartholomew, The Times Atlas, London, 1922.

This article is a slight revision of a talk given on March 25, 2019, in Oxford, England. The associated university is not named at the request of the society’s president, who was concerned about possible repercussions.

I would like to thank the Terrorism Research Society (TRS) for kindly hosting this event. 

The historical map shown here is from 1922, and shows what China looked like when the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 in Shanghai. It shows East Turkestan and Tibet in the west as autonomous regions — much more autonomous than they are today.

East Turkestan is now occupied militarily by China and officially called the Xinjiang region of northwestern China. In Chinese, “Xinjiang” means “new frontier”. But Xinjiang has an ancient history as a culturally diverse crossroads of trading on what the Chinese call “the silk road”, but which was was actually more Iranian than Chinese. It was central to the ancient Persian trading areas called the Sogdian network by historians. It has been home to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, to Mongolians, Indians, Greeks, Koreans, Buddhists, and Christians. Since at least the First East Turkestan Republic of 1933 is has been called East Turkestan by Turkic Muslim residents. The Chinese Communist Party in Beijing has indiscriminately labeled Uyghurs who support an independent East Turkestan today, as separatist and terrorist in their goals and means. The acronym of the Chinese Communist Party is the “CCP”. The CCP seeks to colonize and extinguish all linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity in Xinjiang today, in order to assimilate the territory under its own preferred Han Chinese race, and their own atheist communist ideology.

In the face of such extreme repression, some Uyghurs have indeed advocated separatism and utilized terrorism and violence, including street riots, as a means.

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Tariff Benefits Will Exceed Costs When National Goals Are Met

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 2019 

By William R. Hawkins

US President Donald Trump, with US Congressman Sean Duffy (L), holds a tariff table as he speaks in the Cabinet Room of the White House on January 24, 2019. Trump spoke about the unfair trade practices of China. Credit: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty

A discussion paper published last weekend by the Centre for Economic Policy Research in the UK claimed that the tariffs President Donald Trump has imposed on Chinese products are “causing the diversion of $165 billion a year in trade leading to significant costs for companies having to reorganize supply chains.” The paper was authored by Princeton and Federal Reserve economists, and calls this a “cost” on the U.S. economy. But the basis of their analysis is much too narrow. They do not understand that the “diversion” of trade is a sign that the President’s policy is working. We need to reduce the ties between American companies and an increasingly threatening China. And I have no sympathy if those who sought to profit by helping Beijing’s rise (even if “experts” told them it was a good thing for the world) now suffer transition costs. Trump’s actions were prompted by national security concerns.

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A Chaotic Start: Foreign Affairs in the New U.S. Congress

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 2, February 2019

By William R. Hawkins

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (L) meets with Nechirvan Barzani, outgoing Prime Minister of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in the province’s capital Arbil during a Middle East tour, on January 9, 2019. The eight-day tour comes weeks after the US President announced that the United States would quickly pull its 2,000 soldiers out of Syria, declaring that IS — also known as ISIS — had been defeated. Credit: Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP/Getty.

It is widely held that the direction of foreign policy has shifted almost wholly to the executive branch. The only issue being under which president did this happen? Ronald Regan? Franklin Roosevelt? Woodrow Wilson? Teddy Roosevelt? Or even George Washington as the inherent result of the creation of the presidency itself. The Constitution was created to correct the lack of national leadership in the prior Confederation period when there was only a Congress. But one only needs to look at the first actions of the 116th Congress to understand why a major factor in this evolution of power has been the confusion and institutional flaws that render Congress unsuited for the conduct of international affairs. Its role is limited to being a forum for supporting or opposing the policies set by the Commander-in-Chief.

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THE BATTLE FOR WEST PAPUA

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2019 

By Ben Bohane


Supporters carry West Papuan leader Benny Wenda through Port Vila, Vanuatu, during a visit on December 1, 2016. Pacific island countries across the region are growing in solidarity with the West Papuan independence movement, according to the author. Credit: Ben Bohane.

Reports of the Indonesian military using white phosphorous munitions on West Papuan civilians in December are only the latest horror in a decades-old jungle war forgotten by the world. But new geopolitical maneuvering may soon change the balance of power here, prompting regional concern about an intensifying battle for this rich remote province of Indonesia. It is time for the US and Australia to change policy, complementing Pacific island diplomacy, or risk a major strategic setback at the crossroads of Asia and the Pacific.

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Huawei and China: Not Just Business as Usual

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2019 

By Douglas Black

A man looks at his phone near a giant image of the Chinese national flag on the side of a building in Beijing, during the 19th Communist Party Congress on October 23, 2017. GREG BAKER/AFP/Getty Images

To the average consumer around the world, Huawei is likely thought of as a Chinese company that makes nice phones — a “Chinese Apple” of sorts. The average American consumer might associate the firm as one that makes nice phones but, for some vague, political reasons, is not trustworthy. As of early December, the average Canadian consumer might recognize Huawei as the company at the focus of some political gamesmanship between the US, Canada, and China. All of these lay-interpretations are indeed valid, but there is a great deal more going on than revealed by a cursory glance. This article is intended as a brief explainer of Huawei’s history and current market position, the importance of the company to the ruling Communist Party and their strategic goals, and the far-reaching implications of the outcome of the arrest of Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou.

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Wall Street Elites Against Democracy? A Case Study in Pro-China Media Bias

Press Reaction to the November 2018 speech by Dr. Peter Navarro, Director of the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, was biased in a negative direction.

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 2018 

By Anders Corr, Ph.D.

U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks before signing ‘Section 232 Proclamations’ on steel and aluminum imports with (2nd L-R) Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and White House National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro in the Roosevelt Room of the White House on March 8, 2018 in Washington, DC. Trump signed proclamations that imposed a 25-percent tarriff on imported steel and a 10-percent tarriff on imported alumninum. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Dr. Peter Navarro, Director of the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, gave a speech on November 9 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. The title of the speech was “Economic Security as National Security”, which Dr. Navarro, a Harvard-educated economist, argues is the maxim of the Trump Administration. After the speech, Dr. Navarro was attacked in the media, but not about his main points. The negative, and one might argue biased, coverage came from the Wall Street Journal, CNBC, the Atlantic, and Director of the National Economic Council, Larry Kudlow, among others. The negative response centered on Dr. Navarro’s controversial claim that Wall Street elites have undue influence on U.S. policy having to do with China.  Tempers were likely frayed at the time due to planning, negotiations and internal maneuvering in advance of a high stakes late November meeting then being planned between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping at the G-20 meeting in Argentina. Worries were high that lack of progress on at least the outline of an agreement at the meeting could lead to deepening tariffs between the countries, and fears in the financial sector of falling stock markets or even a recession. But the bias and infighting of the attacks were unbecoming of these media outlets, and of Mr. Kudlow, the Director of the National Economic Council.

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