China’s Strategic Pivot Towards the South Pacific Island Nation of Tonga

A Hybrid Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) Analytical Assessment

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 12, December 2017

By Mark Anthony Taylor

The aim of this research is to critically examine the refocusing of Chinese aid, economic involvement and diplomatic attentions towards the small South Pacific island nation of Tonga.  The research seeks a deeper understanding of China’s behaviour towards Tonga and promotes a reevaluation of how the US and its allies should respond to China’s strategic calculus. China’s actions in Tonga, although appearing benign, represent a cloaked threat to Tonga’s independence, democracy and U.S. regional aspirations.  Furthermore, owing to the comparative strength of the Chinese economic and diplomatic approach, a competitive soft-power response from the US may prove inadequate. In consequence, it may be more advantageous for the US to pursue a heightened hard-power response to ameliorate any potential threat. Through undertaking an analysis of China’s fundamental motivations for the soft-power Tongan pivot and an exploration of the modus operandi employed by China to affect its strategic goals, the project will endeavour to provide a clear answer to the following research question: “Is this Chinese pivot towards Tonga merely an example of cheque-book economic diplomacy, or does it entail a cloaked malignant threat to the security and autonomy of the US and its allies?” Utilising a hybrid adaption of the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) analytic method[1], this project will apply a structured framework in order to probe and reconceptualise the Chinese pivot towards Tonga in an effort to unravel the underlying motivations of China. In line with this approach, the project will firstly scrutinize the situational variables resident in each nation that comprises the terrain of the issue. The significant and unique political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and informational system factors (PMESII) that contribute to the rapid intensification of China/Tongan relations will be explored. From this point, the focus will be turned towards an analysis of the usefulness of the two polar theoretical explanations (liberal and realist) for the current Chinese Course of Action (COA) in Tonga. Lastly, a detailed investigation of the two key Centres of Gravity (COG’s) that underpin and impact upon the China/Tonga relationship will ensue, exploring the cultivation of pro-China sentiment in Tonga and the degree of the US pivot to the South Pacific. The project will draw from a diverse variety of academic publications, expert opinion pieces and news media sources. The analysis reveals that the Chinese strategic pivot into the nation of Tonga superficially appeared to be motivated by benign economic opportunism. However, engagement with Tonga was found to hold a minimal benefit to China in terms of resource supply or economic gain. The major strategic benefits that were found to accrue to China were through the potential securing of Tonga for the establishment of a forward operating military base in the South Pacific. Consequently, China’s pivot may be motivated by concealed Chinese hegemonic designs (the realist perspective) rather than by benign economic opportunism (the liberal perspective). This motivation was found to pose a significant security threat to the US-lead regional order.  Two significant COG’s are bolstering the effectiveness of China’s Tongan pivot. Firstly, China has successfully executed a “hearts and minds” program to facilitate the broad interweaving of pro-China sentiment into the psyche of Tongan society. Secondly, the absence of US attention towards soft-power regional engagement with Tonga has aided China’s pivot. In terms of an effective US response to China’s strategy in Tonga, a revised US soft-power push was assessed as constituting an ineffective strategy due to the resilient China-Tonga relationship that now exists and because of China’s deep aid pockets. Consequently, the evidence points towards the need for a revitalised US hard-power military presence in the region as the most viable option for dampening China’s future militaristic ambitions towards Tonga.

One pa’anga and two pa’anga banknote.
Tonga, Pacific. Credit: Getty Images.

Continue reading

DUP’s Ascent in Westminister and Renewed Political Instability In Belfast

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 7, August 2017

By Arindrajit Basu

As the United Kingdom attempts to recover from the fall-out of Theresa May’s failed gamble via an artificial ‘confidence and supply’[i] arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland, we must consider what this billion pound deal[ii] means for the immediate future of the ‘troubled’ devolved Parliament in Stormont.

United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May meets with Arlene Foster, head of the Democratic Unionist Party.

Continue reading

Iranian Presidential Elections: Does It Really Matter Who Wins?

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 2017

By Cyrus Nezakat

As the conclusion of the Iranian presidential election looms, there have been a plethora of opinions from analysts, political experts and journalists regarding the implications of the outcome of the elections. The prevailing opinions are centered on the status quo differentiation of the progressive and conservative parties in Iran and their respective candidates: incumbent President Hassan Rouhani and his chief opponent Ibrahim Raisi.

Continue reading

Nepal milestone towards increased stability

Nepal passed a modest milestone today in its attempts to improve stability . The four top political parties named Supreme Court Chief Justice Khilraj Regmi as head of an interim government. The main goal of Regmi will be to hold elections by June 21 for a new parliament empowered to adopt a constitution (ABC News).

However, we are not overly optimistic. Smaller political parties led violent riots in opposition to Regmi, it is unclear whether elections will actually be held, and even if elections are held, it is unlikely they will lead to a constitution. The last parliament elected for the purpose of deciding on a constitution — in 2008 — was unable to agree on one during its four-year tenure. Nothing fundamental has changed in Nepalese politics to suggest that a constitutional breakthrough will occur in the near future.