Why the UN Fails to Prevent Mass Atrocities

Violent Incidents and Reporting Bias in the South Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2017 to 2022

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 10, No. 8, August 2022

UN forces in Minembwe, South Kivu taken on 2 April 2019. Source: Delphin Ntanyoma.

Delphin Ntanyoma
Erasmus University

Fidele Sebahizi
Liberty University

Prosper Baseka wa Baseka
Bircham International University

1. Introduction

This study includes preliminary analysis of 324 violent incidents in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) recorded by Kivu Security Tracker (KST) and 29 reports of the United Nations Peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known as Mission de Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo (MONUSCO).[1]

Since its creation and deployment in 1999, MONUSCO is now facing unprecedented protests as local populations in Eastern DRC are demanding its immediate withdrawal. Between July 25 and July 26, 2022, protesters from the main cities in North Kivu and South Kivu stormed MONUSCO bases in Beni, Butembo, Goma, and Uvira to express their anger at the 22-year-long UN mission’s failure to stabilize the region.  Following these incidents, including the one that took place at the Uganda-DRC border, it is believed that 32 civilians and 4 peacekeepers died. Continue reading

The Old World Order Endures

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 2022

President Joe Biden addresses the nation in the Roosevelt Room, 2022. Source: CNN.

William R. Hawkins
President of the Hamilton Center for National Strategy

President Joe Biden has been using the term “inflection point” in his speeches. At the U.S. Naval Academy on May 27 he said, “Class of 2022, you are graduating at an inflection point not only in American history but in world history. And I mean it. The challenge we face and the choices we make are more consequential than ever. Things are changing so rapidly that the next 10 years will be the decisive decade of this century, because they’re going to shape what our world looks like and the values that will guide it not just for the immediate future, but for generations to come.” Yet, he didn’t lay out what those changes would be. He moved directly to a discussion of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “A direct assault on the fundamental tenets of rule-based international order. That’s what you’re graduating into.” He then told them “You’ll learn to crew the most advanced ships in the world, train the most elite combat units, conduct undetected submarine missions, fly the most advanced fighter planes. But the most powerful tool that you’ll wield is our unmatched network of global alliances and the strength of our partnerships.”

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Mineral Revenue-Sharing as Peace Dividend: Incentivizing Stakeholders to Support Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 6, June 2021

Mineral Map of Afghanistan. Source: USGS

Priscilla A. Tacujan, Ph.D.
Analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense

 

Various players have raised the prospect over the years of Afghanistan developing its mineral wealth as a means to stabilize the country, but nobody believes that it could achieve enough security to prevent attacks on infrastructure and mining operations.  However, it is possible that Afghanistan might be able to broker peace and reconciliation through a mineral revenue-sharing scheme[1] that directly distributes mining dividends and profits to the general population as well as extract concessions from the Taliban — an approach that has helped mitigate conflict in some other war-torn areas where revenue-sharing has been part of their peace accords.[2]  A trickle-down incentive structure could incentivize the Afghan people and militant groups to pursue peace and reconciliation if they become vested stakeholders and direct beneficiaries of their country’s natural resources.  While security conditions in Afghanistan’s extractive industries remain a challenge, a review of successful revenue-sharing practices in other countries suggests that a similar practice in Afghanistan may yield long-term gains.

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Myanmar: A Fight For Democracy Against the February 1 Coup

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 3, March 2021

This article is by an anonymous university student in Myanmar (Burma) who is currently supporting the pro-democracy social movements there against the February 1 coup. Anonymity has been granted to the author due to the threat against his person that might result from a byline.

Pro-democracy protesters in Myanmar (Burma) following the February 1, 2021 coup.

On March 15th, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) announced that they moved Myanmar (Burma) to the “Current Crisis” category, as populations here face crimes against humanity perpetrated by military coup leaders, known as the Junta. That followed the  the March 2 announcement by civil society groups of the Myanmar Military as a terrorist group. Their legitimacy and tactics are, in fact, those of terrorists rather than a government, as they have attacked democratically-elected government officials, and shot randomly into people’s homes in an attempt to quell a rising social movement in defense of President U Win Myint, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, other government officials, and civil society leaders. Continue reading

As 300,000 Hong Kongers Move To Britain, It’s Time To Rethink Immigration Policy

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2021

Did British Prime Minister Theresa May’s ‘Hostile Environment Policy’ help Russian President Vladimir Putin? Wikimedia Commons

Bertie Harrison-Broninski
Freelance Journalist and Editor

2021 marks ten years since the start of the Syrian Civil War, and we’re reaching the end of a decade of European and British politics defined by the migrant crisis. Anti-refugee campaigning contributed to the Brexit vote in the UK, and to far-right governments across Europe, such as Viktor Orban’s in Hungary, or Andrezej Duda’s in Poland. 

Yet two seemingly contradictory developments in British policy this month demonstrate that the Brexit architects who are now leading the UK government lack Orban or Duda’s clarity around their attitude towards immigration. 

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