Is The Persecution Of Falun Gong In China Tantamount To Genocide?

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 9, September 2021

Destruction of Falun Gong books during the 1999 China crackdown. Wikimedia/ClearWisdom

Helen Hintjens, Ph.D.
International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague

“Genocide is a crime for which there has to be proof of a particular hostile state of mind in an individual or in a government body towards a group that qualifies under the Genocide Convention’s or the ICC Statute’s limited set of groups against whom genocide can be committed”.[1]

Since at least 2000, at the behest of Jiang Zemin, President of the PRC from 1993 to 2003, Falun Gong have been labelled a ‘heretical (or deviated) religion’, and its members systematically persecuted through a covert ‘6-10 Office’ group of Chinese government security officers.

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Third Party Monitors in CFIUS National Security Mitigation Agreements — How to Do it Right

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 2021

Figure 1. Source: CFIUS Annual Reports to Congress; Ankura Analysis

Randall Cook
Senior Managing Director at Ankura

Alan Levesque
Senior Managing Director at Ankura

Waqas Shahid
Senior Managing Director at Ankura

  1. Overview

This paper describes the role, value proposition, and optimal approach of the independent Third Party Monitor (“TPM”) in National Security Agreements (“NSAs”) between transaction parties and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”).[1] When effectively scoped and executed, TPMs provide tailored, adaptive mitigation oversight capabilities that are a critical enabler for the dual imperatives of protecting U.S. national security interests and ensuring that U.S. enterprise and innovation continue to have access to the fuel of global capital. The TPMs persistent presence, programmatic monitoring, and deployment of industry-specific technical expertise, among other capabilities, uniquely facilitate verified, real-time, and efficient operationalization of NSA requirements; CFIUS assurance that foreign investment risks to U.S. national security are effectively and proactively mitigated; and transaction parties’ ability to operate a business that is both successful and NSA-compliant. An effective TPM approach is necessarily collaborative and adaptive, enabling a trust-based environment where all NSA stakeholder goals can be achieved through iterative, practical interaction and improvement. Continue reading →

Bangladesh’s Economic Rise and the Geo-political Implications

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 2021

Dhaka, Bangladesh, in November 2007. Md. Ziaul Hoque.

Tridivesh Singh Maini
Jindal School of International Affairs,OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat

In recent years, Bangladesh has exhibited healthy growth rates and emerged as an engine of South Asian growth. In 2019 for instance, the South Asian nation grew at an impressive 8.4%. The country witnessed a 9% rise in per capita income for the year 2020-2021 (its per capita income was estimated at 2,227 USD, and it surpassed India’s GDP per capita during 2020-2021 which was 1,947 USD).

The World Bank has revised Bangladesh’s GDP growth for 2020-2021, as a result of higher than expected remittance flows (while earlier it had predicted that the South Asian nation’s GDP would grow by 1.7% it has revised estimates to 3.6%). The International Monetary Fund’s forecasts for the South Asian nation’s economic growth are higher. “According to IMF, [the] global economy will grow by 6.0% in real term[s] in 2021 and 4.4% in 2022. Whereas, their forecast for Bangladesh is 5.0% in 2021 and 7.5% in 2022,” said the minister.

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Mineral Revenue-Sharing as Peace Dividend: Incentivizing Stakeholders to Support Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 6, June 2021

Mineral Map of Afghanistan. Source: USGS

Priscilla A. Tacujan, Ph.D.
Analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense

 

Various players have raised the prospect over the years of Afghanistan developing its mineral wealth as a means to stabilize the country, but nobody believes that it could achieve enough security to prevent attacks on infrastructure and mining operations.  However, it is possible that Afghanistan might be able to broker peace and reconciliation through a mineral revenue-sharing scheme[1] that directly distributes mining dividends and profits to the general population as well as extract concessions from the Taliban — an approach that has helped mitigate conflict in some other war-torn areas where revenue-sharing has been part of their peace accords.[2]  A trickle-down incentive structure could incentivize the Afghan people and militant groups to pursue peace and reconciliation if they become vested stakeholders and direct beneficiaries of their country’s natural resources.  While security conditions in Afghanistan’s extractive industries remain a challenge, a review of successful revenue-sharing practices in other countries suggests that a similar practice in Afghanistan may yield long-term gains.

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Schumer’s No-Good, Weak-Kneed, Sold-Out, Sorry Excuse For a China Bill

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2021

U.S. Senate Photographic Studio/Jeff McEvoy, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

There’s a dump truck of a China bill coming your direction from Congress, and it’s chock-full of cotton balls. Not a pretty sight. Conservatives and some tough-on-China Democrats are not happy. 

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), the symphony conductor driving this cacophonous beast towards a vote in the next few days or weeks, is in bed with big money. Since 2015, he garnered over $14 million from large individual contributors and over $4 million from PACs (including other candidate committees) for his campaigns. Lawyers have given over $1 million, and lobbyists over $600,000. 

Universities spend big on lobbyists, and can have cash-cow satellite campuses in China that they seek to protect. U.S. Education lobbying sometimes reaches over $100 million per year in aggregate. As far back as 2020, companies effectively lobbied against new laws to limit forced Uyghur labor from China in the American supply chains of companies like Nike, Coca Cola, Adidas, Calvin Klein, Costco, H&M, Campbell Soup, Patagonia, and Tommy Hilfiger.

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