Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 2016

Traditional Geopolitical Risks for GSCs (Source: PWC – Transportation & Logistics 2030 [p. 17])

Abstract

The geopolitical underpinnings of economic globalization are changing. Transnational corporations (TNCs) and their network of supply-chains have to operate in a business environment in which emerging geo-economic forces are interacting with shifting geopolitical realities. The challenges for geopolitical risk management will increase in a world of multiple poles of economic power.  TNCs and firms operating globally will need to develop a sense of strategic awareness of the new geo-economic spheres of influence and the systemic geopolitical risks reshaping the interdependence of countries and companies in the global marketplace. Corporate geopolitics need to be an essential component of business strategy.

Continue reading →

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 5, May 2016

Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands. This is one of the islands that the Chinese government has contrasted in the South China Sea. Source: Flickr.

Sean R. Liedman

Abstract:  

Since the end of World War II, U.S. strategy towards China has tacked between three central policy themes: containment, cooperative engagement, and competition. Additionally, a fourth unstated strategic theme undergirds the above: prevailing in the event of conflict. Even though they are fundamentally conflicting ideas, the principles of cooperation and competition remain central tenets of the U.S. strategy versus China today, and the tension between those two principles has been on full display in the South China Sea since 2012. Looking to the future, the United States has three broad policy options vis-à-vis recent Chinese activities in the South China Sea: 1) “Continued concession” to Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea in the interest of achieving broader strategic objectives, 2) “Freeze the status quo”, or 3) “Roll back” Chinese expansion and excessive sovereignty claims. Key observable metrics will indicate which of these policy options is being followed, the range of diplomatic and military strategies to achieve those policy aims, and their likely outcomes.

Continue reading →

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 2016

A Syrian refugee camp in Turkey, 2016. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on Friday called on the Syrian government to “stop the violence in the name of humanity”, during a visit to the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, close to the Syrian border. Source: European Parliament via Flickr.

Bhakti Mirchandani
Senior Vice President at An Alternative Investment Management Firm

As the war in Syria hit its five-year mark this past Tuesday, the European strategy for managing the nearly 1 million Syrian refugees[1] seeking asylum in Europe is not working.  While most of the refugees that arrived in Europe in 2015 left Syria last year, others are leaving countries of first asylum Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon for Europe after years of hardship.[2]  By way of background, first asylum countries are those that allow refugees to enter their territory for temporary asylum while waiting for resettlement or repatriation.  The European Commission is hoping that another deal with Turkey and stronger Schengen Area external border controls will tackle the biggest European refugee crisis since World War II.  As long as Syrian refugees lack the assistance they need in Syria and countries of first asylum, they will continue to make perilous journeys to Europe[3] on unseaworthy boats.[4]  While the EU and Turkey negotiate a controversial refugee exchange program and the European Commission weighs the establishment of a “European Border and Coast Guard” with a larger budget and more authority than current EU management agency Frontex,[5]  the US should fund financially sustainable relief and development to Jordan in parallel with its extensive humanitarian and military aid.  Jordan’s commitment to peace and moderation in the Middle East and cooperation with the US on security matters and counterterrorism make it a vital US ally.

Continue reading →

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 2016 

MANILA, PHILIPPINES – FEBRUARY 4, 2016 – A protester gestures during a protest rally against the legality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in front of the US Embassy in Manila, Philippines. (Photo by Richard James M. Mendoza / Pacific Press)

Timo Kivimäki[1]
University of Bath

In East Asia, two approaches for maintaining stability have been especially fruitful: developmentalism and non-interference. This article investigates the possibility of supplementing non-interference and developmentalism by building a legal order. It will explore ways that take the social construction of social structures seriously and applies them in a constructivist manner to the analysis of interaction of social realities with material realities and purposive agency. The intention is to show that the social construction of realities is also a realistic perspective, and that the perceived material realities, too, are largely dependent on social construction for their causal power in the creation of the situation of the South China Sea conflicts. Continue reading →

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 2016

Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond (L), and President Xi Jinping (R) in London, 2015. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Kerry Brown, Ph.D.
King’s College, London

Abstract

This paper takes the example of the Chinese claims on the South China Sea, particularly since the appointment of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in late 2012, and looks at the ways in which the Party and the government interact over foreign policy issues, along with how others contribute to this process. It shows that the Party leadership works through articulation of highly abstract macro policy goals, issuing high-level guidance for state, military, corporate and public entities without risking specific details. There is then some space for these “lower bodies” to negotiate and create their own standpoint. This does not mean that the process is solely top-down. What it does mean is that the Party under Xi has a dynamic process by which it allows voices within society to contribute to the formulation of policy in an iterative manner. It also shows how for the Xi leadership the South China Sea is part of a process to establish other forms of legitimacy beyond those simply described as economic. In this way, the Party is able to present itself as the restorer of national pride and rejuvenation and gain immense political capital from this. In this context, the South China Sea is as much a domestic issue as a foreign policy one, something that is often missed in external analysis of this issue.

Continue reading →