Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 14, No. 8, August 2026

The result of a March 2, 2024 explosive Shahed drone hitting a nine-story residential building in Ukraine. For years, Iran has produced and sold Shaheds to Russia, knowing they are for use against Ukraine. Source: Office of the President of Ukraine.

By Anders Corr

The Senate passed the Russia sanctions bill earlier this month, and now it is expected to pass the House fairly easily. The bill should be passed, as it will increase pressure on Russia’s leadership, economy, defense industrial base, and top foreign enablers. 

The bill is not only about Ukraine, but will help deter Russia from attacking NATO countries. Russia has already used sabotage, influence campaigns, espionage, GPS interference, hacking, and assassination on NATO soil. On July 20 and July 21, the Lithuanian and Polish governments warned that Russia is considering new attacks on NATO allies. These could include the use of captured Ukrainian drones in a false flag or hybrid attack. In addition to Poland and Lithuania, all of the Baltic states and Romania are at particularly high risk.

As Russia’s economic lifelines are cut, including through sanctions pressure on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, Putin will theoretically be forced to the negotiating table and end the war in Ukraine. But, this is no sure thing. 

The war has for a long time not been going well for Putin, with over 1.4 million Russian casualties and as many as 625,000 Ukrainian casualties. Given that Putin’s goal was to conquer Ukraine as a prize, he fails as he destroys the object of his goal, and his goal destroys Russia. The front is moving at a snail’s pace, and the increasing range, sophistication, and lethality of indigenously-produced Ukrainian weapons are wreaking havoc on Russia’s energy infrastructure and its strategic military assets, including attack submarines and nuclear-capable bombers. 

From purely national security considerations, the Russian military should therefore consider changing tack, whether or not Putin agrees. The Russian army, navy, and air force are being severely degraded when they are needed to defend Russia’s east against China. Military exhaustion in Russia, as in Afghanistan in 1989 with a short-lived democratization following two years later, could be the fertile soil from which a new and more stable Russian democracy emerges. With democracy would come trade openings to the West and major gains in GDP growth and general economic prosperity.

International pressure on Russia is likely necessary to achieve this end because there is no real vote in Russia and its citizens are not allowed to significantly dissent from the regime’s policies. Those Russians who dare criticize the regime are often intimidated and flee. The long arm of Russian law and extrajudicial violence attempts to follow them, including through extraterritorial laws currently under consideration in the State Duma to deny dissidents the services of Russian banks, property transactions, and consulates for renewing passports.

There are opportunities to sharpen the Senator Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026. President Donald Trump has called on Congress to add Russia’s partner Iran to the bill. Getting tougher on Tehran is right given that Iran assisted Russia in its war and is waging a war against Israel, a U.S. ally. At least seventeen U.S. service members have been killed in the war with Iran, and over 400 injured. The White House has also discussed adding Hezbollah, the Iran-backed terrorist group in Lebanon, to the bill. The Houthis in Yemen imposed a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20, so perhaps the Houthis should be added as well. Let’s not forget China and North Korea, both of which aided Russia’s war and are getting stronger as they watch central Europe and the Middle East burn along with U.S. munition stores.

One legitimate concern with all of these potential new sanctions and tariffs against the CRINKs (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) is that they could negatively impact the value of the U.S. dollar. In countries such as Russia, Belarus, Myanmar, and Kyrgyzstan that face U.S. sanctions, banks have in recent history tended to reorient towards trade in China’s currency, the renminbi. This could contribute to the weakening of the U.S. dollar as the primary international hard currency, and the strengthening of China’s international financial position at the expense of the U.S. Treasury.

This is a valid concern, even though about fifty-seven percent of all global foreign exchange reserves are still in U.S. dollars. Such concerns can be addressed in the long-term by thinking outside the box of U.S. borders through new U.S. tolls assessed in dollars on places like the Strait of Hormuz, as proposed by Trump, or against China’s global trade. Such taxes would arguably increase international demand for the dollar and so stabilize its value despite the sanctions. The strategy carries with it a heightened risk of international conflict, as seen with Iran, but the alternative is a U.S. isolationism that would leave a power vacuum likely filled by the regime in Beijing.

Sharpening the Russia sanctions law would produce a better bill that more specifically targets Russia and its leading enablers, China and India. Tariffs on these countries could be based on their business with Russia, and imposed immediately by Congress without any other unnecessary red tape. Congress has the Constitutional power to impose tariffs on these countries today in response to their purchases of Russian energy. Brazil and Turkey could be added as they too are inconstant democracies that purchase energy from Russia and often side with Beijing or Moscow in other ways. 

Relatively easy access to American and allied markets should be reserved for those countries that do not give succor to adversary countries like Russia and China. Countries that partner with Moscow and Beijing, for example through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), should be distanced through tariffs as unreliable.

U.S. allies should pass matching laws that are at least as tough as those proposed in Washington. We must act together against rogue dictatorships and terrorist states, or risk their continued wars and threats against the democracies.

Anders Corr has a BA in political science from Yale University, a PhD in Government from Harvard University, and extensive international experience in the field of intelligence. His most recent book is The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy & Hegemony (Optimum Publishing International, 2021).