Category Archives: Aerospace Defense

Iran and the Russia Sanctions Bill

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 14, No. 8, August 2026

The result of a March 2, 2024 Shahed UAV hitting a nine-story residential building in Ukraine. For years, Iran has produced and sold explosive Shahed drones to Russia for use against Ukraine. Source: Office of the President of Ukraine.

The result of a March 2, 2024 explosive Shahed drone hitting a nine-story residential building in Ukraine. For years, Iran has produced and sold Shaheds to Russia, knowing they are for use against Ukraine. Source: Office of the President of Ukraine.

By Anders Corr

The Senate passed the Russia sanctions bill earlier this month, and now it is expected to pass the House fairly easily. The bill should be passed, as it will increase pressure on Russia’s leadership, economy, defense industrial base, and top foreign enablers. 

The bill is not only about Ukraine, but will help deter Russia from attacking NATO countries. Russia has already used sabotage, influence campaigns, espionage, GPS interference, hacking, and assassination on NATO soil. On July 20 and July 21, the Lithuanian and Polish governments warned that Russia is considering new attacks on NATO allies. These could include the use of captured Ukrainian drones in a false flag or hybrid attack. In addition to Poland and Lithuania, all of the Baltic states and Romania are at particularly high risk. Continue reading →

Get Tough on Saudi Nuclear Plans

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 14, No. 8, August 2026

By Anders Corr

Nukes should be a no-go for authoritarian countries, including Turkey and Egypt.

Decommissioned Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at the Titan Missile Museum, Green Valley, Sahuarita, Arizona. Source: Stephen Cobb.

Decommissioned Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at the Titan Missile Museum, Green Valley, Sahuarita, Arizona. Source: Stephen Cobb.

Saudi Arabia wants to build nuclear power plants using U.S. technology. This would be a boon to the U.S. civil nuclear energy industry and limit Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation with Riyadh. The deal is expected to endure 30 years and yield tens of billions in revenues to U.S. companies. Westinghouse Electric Company would likely benefit from at least some of the contracts that result. China has for years outcompeted Westinghouse in exports, so a win in Saudi Arabia would be a win for the United States.

However, there is a nuclear weapons proliferation risk, especially with Saudi Arabia. The authoritarian country and U.S. ally is suspected of seeking nuclear weapons, including through reported nuclear weapons cooperation with Pakistan. According to Tim Willasey-Wilsey, who worked as a diplomat for the British government, “Saudi Arabia had helped fund Pakistan’s nuclear programme since the early 1970s, and Pakistan had reciprocated by providing troops to defend the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.” Willasey-Wilsey was informed in 2010 that “two nuclear-armed aircraft (probably Mirage IIIs at the time) with Pakistani air and ground crews would be placed at the disposal of the Saudis at moments of crisis.” Continue reading →

US Trade Leverage Against China: An Interview with the Coalition for a Prosperous America

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 10, October 2021

The image depicts two Maersk-Sealand 40' containers stacked on top of one another. Train tracks are visible in the background.

China Shipping – Maersk-Sealand 40′ Containers, Quebec, Canada, 2018. Source: Wikimedia.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

This interview with Michael Stumo, the CEO of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, was conducted between October 5-6 via email.

Corr: Why and when did the Coalition for a Prosperous America begin?

Stumo: CPA started in 2008. Domestic manufacturers, farmers, ranchers and workers agreed that the biggest threat to their well being, and that of the economy, was the large, persistent US trade deficit.

Corr: How is Biden’s ally focus going for him on the issue of trade with China? Is Biden’s outreach to allies helping him on this issue?

Continue reading →

“Winning” the Geopolitical Competition with China

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2021

The image is a cartoon depiction of a graph on an upward trajectory. Following three graph bars, two cartoon chess pieces and a bull's eye continue the upward graph trajectory.

Source: Wikimedia

Randall H. Cook
Consultant

By all accounts, the U.S.-China strategic competition is alive and well.  The news that China displaced the United States in 2020 as the world’s preferred destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was followed closely by publication of a new “Longer Telegram” proposing a U.S. whole of government strategy to contain PRC Premier Xi Jinping’s ambition to realign the geopolitical structure with China as the new fulcrum.  The Biden Administration has sharply changed tack from its predecessor on a range of policies.  But on China, there is remarkable continuity.  The Trump Administration reset the U.S. strategic paradigm and there will be no going back.  Complex interdependent engagement is out; realist bipolar competition is the name of the new (but really, a back to the future sort of) game.

Continue reading →

Revisiting Grand Strategy

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 2020

A black and white image depicts the General Board of the U.S. Navy meeting in 1932 in Washington D.C. Seven men are depicted sitting around table in suits.

The General Board of the U.S. Navy meets in 1932 in Washington D.C. This board existed as an advisory body to the Secretary of the Navy from 1900-1950, and was involved in long range strategic planning focused on the maritime security component of U.S. grand strategy. Its members included the Chief of Naval Operations, President of the Naval War College, Commandant of the Marine Corps and head of naval intelligence. Source: Naval Historical Center.

John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.
Professor of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A recent article in Foreign Affairs by Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller hoisted the white flag: “The End of Grand Strategy: America Must Think Small.”   The article implies that an American attempt to develop a grand strategy, or to support the current grand strategy in vogue, are both vain pursuits.

One reaction to prescriptions of this sort, or rather proscriptions, is to examine what the authors mean exactly by “grand strategy,” what is their definition?

Perhaps their definition is so different from other accepted definitions of this concept that there is no need to worry, maybe they are talking about something else.
After all, this author wrote on the topic ten years ago, bemoaning that the problem was rooted in, although not limited to, a general lack of understanding of the meaning of the term, especially by military professionals in the nation’s service and war colleges.   It might be useful to compare my definition with that consigned to the dust bin by the FA authors.

Carl von Clausewitz has written that as military campaigns proceed, the war as a whole replaces the campaign, and the whole country the theater of operations. In other words, grand strategy is “the next stage,” which encompasses the strategic considerations for “the whole country.”

But the authors argue that, “A grand strategy is a road map for how to match means with ends.”

Continue reading →