Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2015.

The ISIL flag, 2014. The IS declaration of a “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria inspired a stream of thousands of foreign fighters to join it and earned it pledges of allegiance by individual militants around the region. Source: Flickr.

Mark Nader
University of Western Ontario

Since proclaiming itself a caliphate on 29 June 2014, militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have killed over 5,000 civilians in Iraq, while displacing hundreds of thousands more.[1] In Syria, ISIL has embedded itself in the country’s ongoing civil war, where the actions of the Islamic State have led to the deaths of more than 200,000 people[2] and the displacement of more than three million civilians.[3] Although ISIL began as a splinter group of al Qaeda, known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), it has since grown into a hybrid organization that is “part terrorist network, part guerilla army, and part proto-state,” within which terrorists with transnational ambitions have taken refuge.[4]

Militants of the Islamic State seek to eliminate the state system altogether and replace it with a global Islamic caliphate that is governed in accordance with Islamic law. The next few pages are devoted to answering the question: what are ISIL’s short, intermediate, and long-term objectives? Many leading foreign policy experts believe that the Islamic State represents an international security threat, however, the degree of this threat, and the strategy that is best to combat it is the subject of disagreement.[5] Next, I will discuss the consequences of failing to destroy ISIL, the contributing factors that led to the rise of this terrorist network, and policy recommendations by experts to combat this phenomenon. It is my position that in order to defeat ISIL we must destroy the organization altogether. This requires a strategy to strengthen the periphery states[6] surrounding ISIL in order to contain their militants and to prevent them from further expanding; a sustained air campaign designed to destroy key infrastructure targets and to disrupt ISIL’s logistical capabilities; and a comprehensive ground operation consisting of combat troops to root out all existing traces of the Islamic State.[7]

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2015.

Recent satellite imagery from the Centre national d’études spatiales (CNES) show that China is building an island on Fiery Cross Reef near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

Matthew Michaelides
Editor of the Journal of Political Risk

Today, 100 participants gathered at the Harvard Club of New York City for the Journal of Political Risk’s Conference on the South China Sea to discuss all aspects of the ongoing territorial dispute between China and the Southeast Asian states of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Papers given at the presentation will be among those compiled and released in a forthcoming book on the South China Sea dispute.

The event opened with a discussion of some of the recent actions taken by China in the South China Sea. Bill Hayton, author of The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale University Press, 2014), spoke on China’s recent island-building operations on several disputed reefs and islands in the South China Sea, including Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef. Mr. Hayton noted that China acts as it does because it genuinely, albeit wrongly, thinks of itself as the rightful owner of maritime territory within the 9-dash line. He noted that China did not claim new features in the recent island-building, rather it built on features occupied for 20 years or more. Lastly, Mr. Hayton predicted that China would continue to expand, provoking further conflict.

Speakers at the event proposed several constructive proposals for resolving the dispute presently facing the Southeast Asian region.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2015.

The authors publish, for the first time, a new map showing the effect of South China Sea Air Strips being built by the People’s Liberation Army, on the Effective Range of Chinese S-400 surface-to-air missiles and the J-10 multi-purpose fighter.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

Matthew Michaelides
Editor of the Journal of Political Risk

In mid-April, China started building a military air strip in the South China Sea,^[1] and to the extent that air strips are replicated on China’s other occupied South China Sea atolls and shoals, it will dramatically increase the effective range of its military aircraft and rocketry, including surveillance, search and rescue, helicopter, transport, bomber, and fighter aircraft, as well as its surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

Chinese air assets advantaged by the South China Sea air strips include the Chengdu J-10^[2] and J-11 fourth-generation multi-purpose fighter jets^[3], the Soviet-made S-400 SAMs^[4], the twin-propeller Y-12 Turbo Panda maritime patrol^[5] and surveillance aircraft, ASW aircraft and helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Pterodactyl Wing Loong^[6], and cruise missiles such as the Chang Zian (Also spelled Chang Jian, or Long Sword)^[7], with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers.^[8]

With its weaponry closer than ever to the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, not to mention potential refueling of bombers and tankers, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)^[9] will have improved air power projection capabilities towards Australia and India.  SAMs based on the new islands will significantly augment already-existing naval SAMs such as the HQ-9 (with an operating range of up to 100km).^[10]

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2015.

Narendra Modi election poster, 2014. Separatists called for a strike as authorities imposed a daytime curfew Monday across the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, barring residents from leaving their homes. Main roads leading into Srinagar were lined with razor wire to contain traffic, and police and paramilitary soldiers were patrolling on foot and in armored vehicles. These and other considerations contribute to high levels of political risk in Kashmir. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Vishrut Kansal
W.B. National University of Juridical Sciences in Kolkata, India

Abstract

The paper is aimed at presenting a conceptual analysis of the political risk that impacts investors, project sponsors, creditors, and host government alike. First, an attempt to conceptualize and define political risk is made along with its subsequent categorization into its different types. Then, the methodologies of mitigating and managing political risk are elucidated upon. Lastly, political risk insurance as a mitigating factor of political risk is briefly dwelt upon. While presenting this overview, concerted attempt has been made to identify the practical techniques that investors and host governments may adopt while undertaking decisions involving political risk.

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