Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 2022
Simon Muwando University of Lusaka
Victor Gumbo University of Botswana
Gelson Tembo University of Zambia
The world has experienced a dramatic increase in the flow of transnational investments following increased internationalization and globalization of firms in the previous decade. Country risk exposure is a cause for concern for all the institutions that are engaged in multinational trade and finance. The main objective of this study is modelling Zambia’s country risk. A mixed method with concurrent research design was employed. Personal interviews were the main instrument for collection of primary data and snowball sampling was used to select the interviewees. Secondary data was collected from the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LSE), Ministry of Finance, Bank of Zambia and Central Statistical Office. An autoregressive distributed lag technique was employed on annual data for the 1994 to 2018 period. This approach was chosen as it works best for small samples. The findings of the study revealed that the short run drivers for country risk of Zambia are beta, current account balance, political risk, unemployment rate and weighted short term interest rates. Current account balance was found to positively affect country risk while beta, political stability, and weighted short term interest rates negatively influence it. The study findings established that the long run determinants of country risk of Zambia are current account balance, betas, political risk, and unemployment rate. From the study findings, current account balance positively influences country risk of Zambia whereas beta, and political stability negatively influence country risk of Zambia. The study concluded that the major determinant of country risk of Zambia in the short run and long run is current account balance as it has significant positive influence. Effective policies need to be implemented by authorities to manage or reduce persistent current account deficits and political risk, in order to manage country risk.
Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 2021
TikTok logo. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
Last year’s “TikTok war” revealed unprecedented hostility of the US government towards the Chinese tech newcomer. The seemingly innocuous software was developed by ByteDance, a Chinese unicorn company. TikTok is a sister app of Douyin, created for the Chinese market. Both apps allow users to share and watch short videos. In July 2020, then-President Donald Trump accused TikTok of a series of breaches, the most serious of which was sharing user data with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Levine, 2020). Yet, some experts, including Adam Segal from the Council of Foreign Relations, considered the near-ban a smokescreen to hinder the growth of the most globally successful Chinese app to date (Campbell, 2020). In 2020, TikTok was the most downloaded app globally, with 89 million new users just in the US (Geyser, 2021). To date, 23% of Americans use or have watched TikTok, with an average American user having spent 14.3 hours monthly on the app in 2020 (Tankovska, 2021).
Corr: Why and when did the Coalition for a Prosperous America begin?
Stumo: CPA started in 2008. Domestic manufacturers, farmers, ranchers and workers agreed that the biggest threat to their well being, and that of the economy, was the large, persistent US trade deficit.
Corr: How is Biden’s ally focus going for him on the issue of trade with China? Is Biden’s outreach to allies helping him on this issue?
Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2021
Randall H. Cook Consultant
By all accounts, the U.S.-China strategic competition is alive and well. The news that China displaced the United States in 2020 as the world’s preferred destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was followed closely by publication of a new “Longer Telegram” proposing a U.S. whole of government strategy to contain PRC Premier Xi Jinping’s ambition to realign the geopolitical structure with China as the new fulcrum. The Biden Administration has sharply changed tack from its predecessor on a range of policies. But on China, there is remarkable continuity. The Trump Administration reset the U.S. strategic paradigm and there will be no going back. Complex interdependent engagement is out; realist bipolar competition is the name of the new (but really, a back to the future sort of) game.
Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2021
US President Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend a meeting during the G20 Osaka Summit in Osaka on June 28, 2019. Source: MEAIndia.
William R. Hawkins Former U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee member
The new NATO 2030: United for a New Era report shows how President Donald Trump has reinvigorated the West’s central international security alliance. It proclaims, “the main characteristic of the current security environment is the re-emergence of geopolitical competition – that is, the profusion and escalation of state-based rivalries and disputes over territory, resources, and values.” This reflects the 2018 National Defense Strategy issued by the U.S. Department of Defense which saw America “emerging from a period of strategic atrophy” into a world of “increased global disorder” where Great Power competition with Russia and China is the major challenge facing the country. By looking at the world as it is, President Trump sent a gale of fresh air into a becalmed foreign policy establishment on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond.