Get Tough on Saudi Nuclear Plans

Posted on August 3, 2026 by admin

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 14, No. 8, August 2026

By Anders Corr

Nukes should be a no-go for authoritarian countries, including Turkey and Egypt.

Decommissioned Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at the Titan Missile Museum, Green Valley, Sahuarita, Arizona. Source: Stephen Cobb.

Saudi Arabia wants to build nuclear power plants using U.S. technology. This would be a boon to the U.S. civil nuclear energy industry and limit Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation with Riyadh. The deal is expected to endure 30 years and yield tens of billions in revenues to U.S. companies. Westinghouse Electric Company would likely benefit from at least some of the contracts that result. China has for years outcompeted Westinghouse in exports, so a win in Saudi Arabia would be a win for the United States.

However, there is a nuclear weapons proliferation risk, especially with Saudi Arabia. The authoritarian country and U.S. ally is suspected of seeking nuclear weapons, including through reported nuclear weapons cooperation with Pakistan. According to Tim Willasey-Wilsey, who worked as a diplomat for the British government, “Saudi Arabia had helped fund Pakistan’s nuclear programme since the early 1970s, and Pakistan had reciprocated by providing troops to defend the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.” Willasey-Wilsey was informed in 2010 that “two nuclear-armed aircraft (probably Mirage IIIs at the time) with Pakistani air and ground crews would be placed at the disposal of the Saudis at moments of crisis.” Continue reading →

Putin’s Nightmares and the Threat of a Nuclear “Accident”

Posted on December 13, 2024 by Assistant Editor

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 12, No. 12, December 2024

By Christopher Shove, Ph.D.

A mural of Putin, Hitler, and Stalin with a slogan “No More Time”. Anthony D Barraclough via Flickr.

As Russian losses mount, Putin’s threat of a nuclear incident becomes all the more likely. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine report dated 10 December 2024, Russian casualties from February 24, 2022 to December 10, 2024 include the following: 755,940 personnel, 9,524 tanks, and 19,596 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). While Ukraine’s estimate may appear high, there is consensus from many intelligence sources that Russian losses are substantial. A recent example is the increase in losses in the Russia Kursk oblast where Ukraine counter-attacked and has occupied since August 6, 2024. Here, Ukrainian soldiers report 10 or more daily waves of Russian attacks on the Kursk battlefield with almost all stopped, resulting in massive Russian losses. As a result, Russia has transferred soldiers from other areas to the Kursk battlefield – with only losses and no gains against Ukraine’s clever tactics. Continue reading →

The Risks of AI: An Interview with Georgetown’s Helen Toner

Posted on January 14, 2022 by Assistant Editor

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2022

Helen Toner, Director of Strategy at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

The JPR interview with Helen Toner, the Director of Strategy at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University, was conducted via email between 4 January 2022 and 13 January 2022.

Corr: What are the national security risks and benefits of AI?

Toner: This is a huge question! AI is a general-purpose technology, meaning that—like electricity or the computer—its impacts will be felt across practically all industries and areas of society. Accordingly, it presents a huge range of potential risks and benefits from a national security perspective. One way of trying to summarize the possibilities might be as follows: the benefits will largely be in line with the kinds of benefits we have seen from increasingly sophisticated computing technology more generally: greater efficiency and accuracy, as well as the ability to perform tasks at scales impossible for humans (think: how Google search trawls the web). In terms of risks, one breakdown proposed by Zwetsloot and Dafoe is to think in terms of risks from accidents (i.e. unintended outcomes from using AI), misuse (i.e. the deliberate use of AI to cause harm), and structural changes (i.e. how progress in AI shapes surrounding systems and dynamics). I realize this is fairly abstract, but it’s impossible to enumerate specific risks without narrowing the scope to particular application areas, time frames, and actors.

Continue reading →

The Banyamulenge Genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Posted on December 7, 2021 by Assistant Editor

On the Interplay of Minority Groups’ Discrimination and Humanitarian Assistance Failure

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 2021

Village in Bibogobogo on fire. Some houses are dotted on a hill surrounded by trees. They are mostly obscured by thick, grey smoke.

Village in Bibogobogo set alight. Photograph by Neri Patrick, taken on October 19, 2021.

Delphin Ntanyoma
Erasmus University

For two weeks now, a humanitarian convoy (five trucks) transporting humanitarian assistance to support the Banyamulenge in Bibogobogo (sometimes spelled Bibokoboko) has been intercepted by administrative and security officials in the city of Baraka [1].Two international humanitarian organizations, including the World Food Program (WFP), that have been working in this region to support displaced and local populations, resolved to support internally displaced Banyamulenge in Bibogobogo. The WFP’s support used an intermediate humanitarian organization, familiar of the context, to provide the assistance. On its way from Uvira to Baraka, rumors circulated that this is not humanitarian assistance but rather that the trucks contained ammunition and guns. Several sources including ones linked to civil society organizations in the region have confirmed that youth in Baraka (who support administrative and security officials) erected barricades to block the trucks. Truck drivers were obliged to unload everything to check what was inside each box. In the end, the search found that there was nothing linked to guns and ammunition. However, the assistance is now stored in Baraka, and it is uncertain if these organizations will be courageous enough to reload and bring the assistance to Bibogobogo. Continue reading →

Mineral Revenue-Sharing as Peace Dividend: Incentivizing Stakeholders to Support Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

Posted on June 26, 2021 by admin

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 6, June 2021

The image shows a map of Afghanistan. A satellite image of the region is contained in the map.

Mineral Map of Afghanistan. Source: USGS

Priscilla A. Tacujan, Ph.D.
Analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense

Various players have raised the prospect over the years of Afghanistan developing its mineral wealth as a means to stabilize the country, but nobody believes that it could achieve enough security to prevent attacks on infrastructure and mining operations. However, it is possible that Afghanistan might be able to broker peace and reconciliation through a mineral revenue-sharing scheme^[1] that directly distributes mining dividends and profits to the general population as well as extract concessions from the Taliban — an approach that has helped mitigate conflict in some other war-torn areas where revenue-sharing has been part of their peace accords.^[2] A trickle-down incentive structure could incentivize the Afghan people and militant groups to pursue peace and reconciliation if they become vested stakeholders and direct beneficiaries of their country’s natural resources. While security conditions in Afghanistan’s extractive industries remain a challenge, a review of successful revenue-sharing practices in other countries suggests that a similar practice in Afghanistan may yield long-term gains.

Continue reading →